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That morning, November 12, had seemed it would be a normal day in the courtroom, if such a
thing existed in the domain of the Honorable Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis.1 The man himself sat
enthroned upon the bench, completely and utterly in control of the room. His piercing eyes bore down
upon the witness with all the avenging righteousness of Johnathan Edwards in the pulpit. In a typically
anonymous profession, Judge Landis’s patrician profile was well known across the nation. The bumbling
witness wilted under the scrutiny of the famous judge and silence filled the courtroom. The silence was
broken by the creak of the door. All eyes turned to the back of the courtroom and met with a truly
extraordinary sight. Through the doors sailed another patrician personage, Charles Comiskey, the Old
Roman of the Chicago White Sox, at the head of eleven of the most famous owners in baseball. These
normally dour men brought with them all the excitement and chatter of the ballpark, surprising the
collected audience. But Landis would not give an inch. This was his domain. The sound of his gavel rang
out. “There will be less noise in the courtroom,” he said, “or I will order it cleared.”2 His tone was as
authoritative as ever, but a close observer would notice a slight smile as he settled into the bench to
continue the case of income tax fraud.3
The World Series of 1919 astounded the nation as the underdog Cincinnati Reds managed to
topple the wildly favored White Sox. Before the series began, rumors of gambling and game throwing
circulated, but were quickly dismissed.4 However, at the end of 1920, “Shoeless” Joe Jackson, Eddie
Cicotte, and Claude “Lefty” Williams confessed to conspiring to throw the Series, and caused upheaval,
not only in the world of Baseball, but across the nation.5 This scandal would make or break professional
baseball. It was a turning point, a time when things came to a head. Alongside the battle in the courtrooms
and the battles in the press, a long-standing rivalry would reach its climactic battle: the rivalry between
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Byron Banfield “Ban” Johnson and Charles Albert “Old Roman” Comiskey. Alongside the need for
leadership change and the need to assuage the press, the rivalry between Charles Comiskey and Ban
Johnson became the driving force behind Judge Landis’s appointment as Commissioner of Major League
Baseball. Landis’ selection as Commissioner marked Charles Comiskey’s victory over his rival Ban
Johnson, and the end of their battle over the Black Sox Scandal.

Since the time of the scandal there has been much debate surrounding the eleven men
who threw the 1919 World Series, known as the Black Sox. At the time, every paper in the
country had its spin on the story, and every layman in the street had his opinion. For the ensuing
decades, memories of the Big Fix were put on a low simmer as Americans were fed a new brand
of baseball and as baseball dealt with newer, bigger problems.6 In 1963 the Big Fix was revisited
for the first time in a scholarly manner, as Eliot Asinof strove to push past the myth of the Black
Sox and “Shoeless” Joe to the truth of the scandal. His book, Eight Men Out, would spark an
academic discussion that is alive and well today. Eight Men Out portrayed the fixers not as
immoral villains out to ruin the national pastime but as men caught in the problems of their
time.7
Since Eight Men Out, Black Sox scholarship has been divided into two main camps:
those who look at the cultural impact of the fix, and those who focus on the impact in baseball.
The most comprehensive work on the cultural impact of the Black Sox is Saying It’s So by
Daniel Nathan. His book examined how the story of the Black Sox has been told and how it
developed throughout the 20th Century.8 Saying It’s So breaks from Asinof’s search for the truth
of the scandal, but rather looks at the myth of the scandal and its impact on culture. Nathan
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tracks the development of the newspaper stories, the crystallization of the myth in the Depression
and WWII, to the impact on movies like The Natural and Field of Dreams.9
On the opposite end of the scholarship stands The Betrayal by Charles Fountain. His
work examined the Black Sox’s effect on the game of baseball, the deadball era that preceded
the 1919 World Series, and the laborious unfolding of the scandal, its coverup, discovery, court
cases, and aftermath.10 The Betrayal widens the scope of the narrative and touches on many of
the outside factors that made the 1919 World Series what it is.11 Standing somewhere in between
the two is Robert Bachin’s article At the Nexus of Labor and Leisure: Baseball, Nativism, and the 1919
Black Sox Scandal. He confronts both the social context of the scandal, like Fountain, while also
considering the changes in cultural ideology, as does Nathan.12
Standing at the end of any narrative of the Black Sox is the appointment of Judge Kenesaw
Mountain Landis as the commissioner of professional baseball. Landis’s appointment marks the end of
the deadball era and the beginning of the homerun-centric baseball of the Roaring Twenties.13 It was
Landis who handed down the lifetime ban that ended the careers of all eight Black Sox conspirators,
guilty or innocent, and brought the scandal to its decisive end. However, his appointment presents a more
complex issue than it may seem at first glance. Whether the driving reason for his appointment was due to
infighting among the owners, or driven by a mere need to appease the press, is a matter of debate among
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scholars. The divisions fall closely along the lines of each author's treatment of the scandal. Nathan
examines Landis’s appointment through the eyes of the press, while Fountain paints a long, political,
narrative spanning years, back to the time of the National Commision.14
Before Judge Landis was appointed as the commissioner, baseball was ruled by the National
commision, a three man group made up of the American and National League presidents and Garry
Herrmann, the commission chairman, and owner of the Cincinnati Reds.15 Ban Johnson was the driving
force of the National Commission from its inception. In 1901, Johnson decided to take a minor league
known as the Western League, turn it into the American League, and challenge the might of the National
League. He pilfered fans and players from the National League, and forced a truce in 1903, when the
leagues merged into the modern two-league system, and the National Commission was born.16
Both Ban Johnson, the American League President, and Chairman, Garry Herrman, would serve
for the entirety of the commission's existence while four different men served as the National League
President.17 While Herrmann was an owner of a National League team, he was able to be swayed by Ban
Johnson, giving Johnson control of the National Commission. Johnson came to be known as the “Czar” of
baseball for his control of the commission, and often acted as if he were the man in charge of all of
professional baseball.18
The National Commission would face many problems including the problem of gambling in
baseball. Gambling had been a part of baseball since almost the very beginning. Baseball in the late
nineteenth century was rife with gambling and this did not change after the league merger.19 Part of

14

Nathan,48.; Fountain, 3-9
Asinof, 74,76.
16
Ibid, 75; Fountain, 66.; Eugene C.Murdock. "The Tragedy of Ban Johnson," Journal of Sport History 1,
no. 1 (1974): 29.
17
Fountain, 21-22.
18
.Murdock, 29.;Surdham and Haupert, 16.; Fountain, 65,211.
19
Charles Fountain, The Betrayal, 17.
15

baseball’s attractiveness lay with the idea that it was a “clean game.” Gambling and game fixing did not
promote that image. Rumors of game fixing began as early as the first World Series, and it did not stop.20
Of all the game fixers, one stands head and shoulders above the rest: the “Babe Ruth of ball-game
fixers,”: Hal Chase.21 Rumors dogged his steps, but he was never once found guilty. In 1910, Chase was
accused of throwing games while playing first base for the New York Highlanders. The matter was
brought before Ban Johnson’s National Commission, but Chase got off clean. The same thing happened
when he was charged at the end of his career while with the Reds, charged but never convicted.22 This
was the typical response of Johnson and the National Commission and would be one of Charles
Comiskey’s weapons against Johnson during the Black Sox Scandal.
The Johnson-Comiskey rivalry started out as a close friendship between the player-manager of
the Cincinnati Reds and a young journalist with a background in law. Charles Comiskey was a native
Chicagoan, who started his baseball career in the middle of a brick delivery for his father. He played for
several teams before he became the player-manager for the Cincinnati Reds in 1894, where he met Ban
Johnson.23 Johnson was an Ohio native, and played baseball in his youth, until a broken thumb ended his
career. He went to Cincinnati to study law, but ended up as the sports editor for the Cincinnati
Commercial-Gazette.24 Johnson and Comiskey cemented their friendship in the “Ten Minute Club” a
popular Cincinnati bar, where they planned the American League. Johnson became the president of a
minor league called the Western League, and in 1900, with the aid of Comiskey as an owner, set about
challenging the National League’s monopoly on professional baseball. They were successful, and with the
merger in 1903, both of their dreams came true.25
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However, cracks began to show in their relationship. The pair would often vacation together with
a group known as the “Woodland Bards.” During one such vacation, someone replaced the shot in
Johnson’s shotgun with paper, and Johnson blamed Comiskey. Another such incident involved Johnson
sending Comiskey some fish after suspending his outfielder, Ducky Holmes. Comiskey took it as an
insult and moved out of their shared offices.26 After that, their friendship turned to rivalry and clashed
over players and matters of baseball governance, especially Johnson’s high-handed, ineffective antigambling methods. Publicly, they were amicable, and Johnson generally ruled fairly in matters
concerning Comiskey, signing off on Comiskey acquiring Eddie Collins and Joe Jackson, two of the
White Sox stars.27 As 1919 approached, their rivalry grew to a fever pitch, and before the start of the 1919
season, Johnson and Comiskey clashed again over the disputed contract of pitcher Jack Quinn. The
National Commission ruled against Comiskey, and the “Old Roman” blamed Johnson.28 The stage was set
for the all-out war that would occur over the next two years.
The beginnings of the Black Sox Scandal are shrouded in mystery. No one knows who was the
real mastermind behind the scheme. Whoever masterminded it, the infamous “eight men out” first
baseman Chick Gandil, ace pitchers Eddie Cicotte and “Lefty” Williams, outfielders Joe Jackson and
“Happy” Felsch, shortstop “Swede” Risberg, third baseman “Buck” Weaver, and utility man Fred
McMullin conspired to throw the 1919 World Series for $20,000 each. Not all of the conspirators
received money, and none admitted to receiving the full $20,000. Cicotte and Risberg received $10,000.
Felsch, Jackson, and Williams each received $5,000. Gandil, the go-between for the players and
gamblers, likely kept most of the money passed on by the gamblers, around $50,000.29 At the time there
were many rumors surrounding the Series, and both journalists and baseballmen alike tried to analyze the
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games to determine the truth. No one reached any conclusive answers, and only journalist Hugh Fullerton
would press the issue.30
Shortly after the World series ended, Charles Comiskey, who was aware that the Series had been
fixed, began working to make the best of the situation.31 Comiskey knew he could rely on the press, as he
was the best liked owner in baseball among the media so he took special care to wine and dine every
visiting newspaperman.32 Comiskey’s first plan of action was to hope that the rumors blew over while
appearing proactive in the investigation of any corruption After consulting his lawyer, Alfred Austrian, he
decided to offer a $20,000 reward (later inexplicably lowered to $10,000) to anyone who had information
about the scandal. He won much sympathy in the press and for the moment, the rumors died down.33
However, they did not go away entirely. Comiskey’s next step was to launch an investigation of the
players, hiring the Hunter’s Secret Service to run the investigation. They found that the players had
definitely fixed the game but would not talk, which is what Comiskey wanted to hear. News of his
investigation filled the papers, and for the moment, all seemed well.34
Things would not stay quiet forever. In September of 1920, due to rumors of a fixed game
between the Cubs and Phillies, a Grand Jury investigation into gambling in baseball was called, and the
Black Sox were officially implicated in throwing the World Series. The cat was out of the bag, and Ban
Johnson threw himself behind the investigation. The Cook County Grand Jury changed courses and began
to investigate the 1919 World Series.35 Things looked bleak for Comiskey, but all was not lost. His team
might be torn apart, but his reputation remained intact.36 The next step of his and Austrian’s plan went
into effect: they had to be seen at the head of the investigation.
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Comiskey ended the indicted players' contracts, and Austrian went after Cicotte, Jackson, and
Williams to get confessions. The first to buckle was Cicotte. Austrian convinced him to confess without
legal counsel before a Grand Jury. It was a pattern that would be repeated for Jackson and Williams.37
With the confessions of three of the conspirators, the matter would move to trial where Comiskey and
Johnson would battle yet again in a seemingly one-sided contest against Comiskey.
The Grand Jury investigation, however, would see the entrance of another man into the fray, the
great gambling giant and mafia boss, Arnold Rothstein. In the trial, Rothstein and Comiskey shared a
common goal: to get the players acquitted. They both had their reasons. Comiskey was trying to salvage
what he could from the scandal and hoped an acquittal would clear his players to play. Rothstien did not
want to appear before the court, so behind the scenes, a powerful alliance took place.38
There was no more ardent supporter of the investigations than Ban Johnson. He spent American
League funds to help the prosecution by hiring investigators and finding the “star witness”.39 Through the
initial investigation and the trial Johnson would use every means he could to destroy his rival, stepping on
many toes in the process and earning him the contempt of the players as well as several owners. The
defense for the players closed their case at trial with an all-out attack, not on the tight-fisted Comiskey,
but on Ban Johnson.40
During the course of the investigations, the owners of the baseball teams across the nation
decided that a change in leadership was necessary to minimize the damages of the scandal on baseball as
a whole; a figure from outside of baseball was needed to “clean up” baseball.41 At the beginning of 1920,
Herrmann retired as the commissioner, but it was not until after the news of the scandal broke that the
owners began to look for a new commissioner in earnest.42 The man who came up with the idea for
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outside involvement was one Albert Laskar, an advertising executive involved with the Chicago Cubs.43
The owners took to the Laskar plan readily, and the search for a new commissioner began.
Ban Johnson opposed the Laskar plan from the beginning. He wanted baseball men in charge of
baseball, not some outsider who had no history in the game.44 Johnson held a tight grip over the American
League, controlling five of the eight teams. The remaining three, Comiskey’s White Sox, the Yankees,
and the Red Sox, all harbored a great loathing for Johnson together with the entirety of the National
League.45 Johnson’s highhandedness throughout his tenure on the National Commission was coming back
to bite him.
The eleven ball clubs against Johnson discussed candidates for the position of commissioner
throughout 1919 and 1920. Men like former President William Howard Taft, WW I generals John
Pershing and Leonard Wood, and Senator Hiram Johnson were all considered.46 However, it was the
candidate suggested by Comiskey’s lawyer, Austrian, and supported by the National League president,
Heydler, that the committee focused on: Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis.47 Landis had a reputation as a
trust-busting champion of justice, famously leveling a fine against John D. Rockafeller’s Standard Oil for
$29 million. However, it was an action Landis made against this image that caught the eye of the
committee. In 1914, Landis had refused to hear the case of the Federal League, a case charging the
National League with a monopoly on professional baseball, and allowed for the matter to be settled out of
court.48 Ban Johnson continued to struggle against Landis’s appointment, countering with his own
proposal, Judge Charles McDonald who had heard the confessions of Cicotte, Jackson, and Williams.49
When Johnson refused to back down, the three rebellious American League teams offered to join
with the National League to form a “New National League.” The threat of being cut out of professional
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baseball broke Johnson’s hold over the loyal five teams under his control, and he was forced to concede.50
Landis was unanimously elected the commissioner, and out of concession to Ban Johnson, the three-man
commission became a one-man commissioner, with the two league presidents acting as advisors.51 The
delegation sent to pitch the job to Landis arrived in the middle of a court case on insurance fraud, and
Landis had to silence the excited owners with his gavel.52 Landis accepted the position for a salary of
$50,000 and retained his job as judge.53
Landis would change the world of baseball forever. He ruled the Major Leagues like he ruled the
courtroom, with an iron fist. He set out on a campaign to “clean out the Crookedness and the gambling
responsible for it.”54 Despite the not guilty verdict of the court in the case of the Black Sox, Judge Landis
barred all eight players from ever playing again. The saga of the Black Sox was over.55
This was just the beginning for Landis. He went on to rule baseball practically autocratically for
his twenty-three-year tenure as the commissioner. His first ruling as commissioner, while rather minor,
would set the tone for his regime. He forced the New York Giants manager, John McGraw, to sell a
casino and horse track that he had bought in Havana. The association with gambling was too close, even
if the purchase was private.56 Landis clashed with Ban Johnson repeatedly, both men sporting huge
egos.57 Johnson continually lost against the new commissioner; his rule was over. Most of Johnson’s
power was gone, swallowed up by Landis. The one-man commissioner meant to give Johnson more
power, backfired, as Landis never consulted the League presidents in anything.58 In the end, Landis forced
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the owners to retire Johnson in 1927.59 Comiskey also never truly recovered from the scandal. He had
succeeded in destroying his enemy, but he himself was burnt out and tired.60
The Black Sox Scandal is a tale littered with enormous egos, from the players on the field, to the
judges and lawyers, to Arnold Rothstien and the gamblers. However, none of these men matched the
stature and ego of Comiskey and Johnson. Both of these men were kings in their own realm, determined
to bring about the ruin of the other. In political battles such as these, it is hard to determine a victor, if
there is one, except by looking at who accomplished their goal when the two come into competition. In
the long rivalry of Johnson and Comiskey, the most obvious instance would be the appointment of the
new commissioner. Both of their goals were mutually exclusive. Each backed one of the two candidates,
and only one, Comiskey’s candidate, won. Not only did their rivalry clash during the appointment, it
brought it to a head. Without Johnson’s alienation of Comiskey, Comiskey would have never gathered the
dissenting teams of the American League and allied themselves with the National League, facilitating the
shift in power away from Johnson. The crisis of the Black Sox Scandal provided an opportunity to
destroy the other, Johnson in the courtrooms, and Comiskey with Landis’s appointment. The scandal
forced Johnson and Comiskey to act, and the aftermath of their actions was a new power in baseball:
Kennisaw Mountain Landis. The actions of these two men had far reaching consequences in the world of
baseball, bringing to an end an era of baseball.
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